University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

5-7-1955

Pressures, Politics, Partnership
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Pressures, Politics, Partnership" (1955). Mike Mansfield Speeches,
Statements and Interviews. 157.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/157

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

PRESSURES, POLITICS, AND PARTNERSHIPS
,Speech of Senator 1v1ike Mansfield, D., Montana;
Ninth Annual World Affairs Conference
Asilomar, California
May 7, 1955'

When your organization invited me to be with you today, I was impressed by the alliteration in the title of the subject to which I was asked to
address my remarks.

~ressures, ~olitics,

and

~artnerships.

There is a

certain harmony in the title, but unfortunately, it is confined to the sound of
the words.

When pressures, politics and partnerships come together in the

practice of foreign policy, any resemblance to harmony is strictly coincidental.
We are more likely to get the equivalent of three high school bands in a parade,
one marching immediately behind the other and each playing a different tune,
as loudly as possible.
That may be somewhat exaggerated but I think it does suggest the
dimensions of the problem of bringing together these divergent forces in
practice.
To carry the simile a little further, if we wished to determine what
tune each band was playing, we would have to epace them a little apart from one
another in the parade. In the same fashion, I would like to separate the
elements in this subject of pressures, politics and partnerships in order to see
what each is contributing to the general uproar which we identify as foreign
policy.
Last August 4th, in a press conference, the President stated that he
thought "we should talk less about American leadership in the world, because we
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are trymg to be a good partner." I thought that an excellent concept.

The

Partnership concept displayed considerable vitality, as a method of foreign
policy, oven though it has only recently been identified as such.

You will

recall, for example, that last !all, progress toward the goal o! German
alinement with the west was at a stalemate when the French rejected the
European Defense Community.

Nevertheless, with the United States standing

by as a partner rather than forcing its laaderehip, the E'uropean countries
quickly devised a new formula for achieving this goal at the London-Paris
Conferences.
Similarly, this country refrained from any leadership of the band at
the Manila Conference last September.

I happened to be a member of the

American Delegation and I can attest to the spirit of cooperation or partnership
that operated there.

Its results are reflected in the Southeast Asia Collective

Defense Treaty and the Pacific Charter which were produced by the Conference.
Again last April when the United States indicated that part of the
American assistance program for Asia would bo channeled on a regional basis.
India immediately called a conference of Asian states to reconcile their
individual national desires with the plans of the United States.
Vihile Partnership is by no meant a new conception, it seems to me
that the President, quite correctly , has given the concept a new emphasis at
this time.

It is more important than ever that our relations, particularly with

the Western European nations, rest upon this basis.

Immediately after the war,

thote countries were in a state of complete exhaustion.

In an economic and in a
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security sense, their survival as free nations depended heavily en the willingness of this country to aid in their recovery.
we ought to be happy that it is.

That period is now largely over and

The Europeans no longer are dependent on the

United States in the degree which existed in the immediate postwar years.

They

have reached a point at which they may be expected to assert the independence of
their position with considerable firmness.

They will not readily be pressured

into the acceptance or rejection of any particular line of policy.

But what they

will not do under pressure, I believe they will do willingly under a partnership
concept which tal<es into full consideration their needs and their aspirations.
The partnership concept is the antithesis of policy by pressure.

It is

a policy of cooperation based on national equality, mutual respect, tolerance of
differences, and free association for the pursuit of essentially common goals.
It is easier to preach partnership, however, than to practice it.

Each

apparent failure of cooperation sets off a new wave of criticism and impatience
in large segments of the people in each of the nations involved in the partnership.
That was true for example in the case of the Geneva Conference and it has been
true to some extent in the case of the Formosan crisis.

I think, therefore, we

should be aware of some of the difficulties involved in maintaining an effective
partnership with other nations. If we are, it may help us to exercise the
restraint and understanding which are essential for the operation of this policy.
First, consider for a moment the difficulties in maintaining a unified
approach to foreign policy even within our own borders. Here we run into the
other two elements in the subject, the politics and the pressures.

We have made

- 4 noticeable e!Jorta in the last few years to minimize the m!luence of parti an
politic• in foreign policy.

In some years, 1947 and

19~'8

and again this rear,

for example, when Congress haa been controlled by one political party and the
Executive Branch by the other, bipartisanship has been euential.

In other

years it has been useful in assuring continuity of action and broad public support
for actions which must be taken abroad.

It has made possible in certain area a,

such as Europe, consistent progress toward the goals of our foreign policy.
In spite of the evident advantage of bipartisanship to the nation, there
are still tendencies on the part of some to play politics with foreign policy
problems.

I do not speak now of those who out of conviction oppose a particular

line of policy.

Bipartisanship is not and must never become a mechanism for

deatroying the right of dissent.

What I have in mind are those who seek to make

political capital out of our national difficulties.

Let me illustrate this point.

As

you well know, the Yalta Agreement is, to put it mildly, a favorite subject of
disagreement in this country. I know there are some who feel that certain
aspects of that agreement are unsatisfactory.

While I may disagree with them,

I respect their right to their viewpoint and their right to express it.
place the Yalta Agreement in proper perspective.

History will

I think the politics are

evident, however, when I am told, as I have been told, of the story of a local
political leader of one of the two great parties.

Prior to a recent election he

castigated all candidates of the opposition, whether they were running for
municipal offices or the Presidency, for being responsible for losing China in
the Malta Agreement.

Voices of that kind make considerable noise and the noise

- 5 -

has often hampered the ability of the nation to cope with the real difficulties which
confront the nation.
It has become increasingly clear in recent weeks, moreover, that the

conduct of foreign policy can be seriously impeded not only by inter-party strife
but also by intra-party dissension.

You people in California would be especially

familiar with that. If we have difficulty, then, in agreeing on international
courses of action, as between our political parties and within them, is it not to
be expected that the difficulties in agreeing with other nations would be even
greater?
Added to the problems of maintaining partnership that are produced by
partisan politics are those stemming from internal pressures.
of all, the pressure of tradition.

There is, first

Partnership represents a substantial departure

from what was, for a long time, regarded as established American policy.
References are still frequently made to George Washington's advise "to steer
clear of permanent alliances. 11
I do not in any way question the sincerity of the cautious and careful
approach of many Americans to foreign commitments; I share it.
be cautious and careful and we are not unique in this respect.

We should

The British

people, for example, have displayed quite correctly in my opinion something
very much akin to these traits in connection with their integration with western
Europe.
I say at the same tim e, however, that we ought not to quote glibly from
George Washington without comparing the world situation which existed in his
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time with that which exists today.

I say that we should not expect George

Waahington•s sage advice in the 18th Century to spare us the necessity of making
the difficult and often painful decisions of foreign policy in tho lOth Century.
Both political parties, as a whole, have rejected pure isolationism as
a policy for the United States of today.

In a world as integrated as is ours today

chance seems slight that we alone can continue to make progress while the rest
of it 1lips into the retrogression of totalitarianism.

From a practical standpoint,

we would have little hope for continued survival and material advance as a free
people if we cut ourselves off from the economic, the defensive, the cultural
and the scientific relationships which we now have with other nations.

We can

reach greater heights of lasting prosperity and peace only in concert with others.
There continue to be a few who cherish the short-sighted notion that the
United States is a self-sufficient, invulnerable fortress.

They would like for

the United States to turn inward in space and backward in time.

In addition,

there are others who have abandoned this isolationist philosophy only with utmost
reluctance.

These profess a willingness to take part in world affairs and to

cooperate with other nations provided in effect that other nations accept our
terms, absolutely and unquestioningly!
American paternalism or dictation.

That is not cooperation.

It is a form of

It leads often to the futile attempt to buy

friends and bludgeon people, all supposedly in the interest of this country.
To those Americans who think in such terms, partnership as an approach
to foreign policy is particularly difficult to accept.

They become distressed when-

ever over-all agreement with our allies is clouded by a disagreement, however
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minor, and they are forever threatening to pick up their marbles and go home.
They are not convinced that we really need cooperation with others.
hand, they are not sure we do not.

On the other

As a compromise, therefore. they assume

that cooperation is acceptable provided others talk exactly like us and act
exactly like us.

One result of pressures of this kind is that we face the danger

that our aid programs are based not on the actual needs of our national policies
but on the relative skills of foreign diplomats in the art of talking and acting in
the fashion that some Americans like them to talk and act.

Another result

is a constant clamor to abandon important allies on the slightest provocation.
Sooner or later we are going to have to learn that sweet and agreeable words
alone do not necessarily make staunch friends in the international arena any
more than in our personal lives.

We will find, 1 think, that substantially common

interests and objectives and give and take with equals who speak their minds is a
more reliable indicator of the worth of some of these alliances.
We are bound to have differences, sometimes rather large and important differences with friendly nations.

We cannot hope to, indeed should not

want to, eliminate the differences which are the hallmark of freedom.

Any

attempt to do so will leave us in the position of the Soviet Union and its
satellites.

That is a monolithic system in which the most powerful member

bludgeons the others into line. And it is precisely that monolithic characteristic
which we expect to result eventually in the disintegration of the Soviet system.
Unless we are looking for the same thing to happen to the ties among the free
nations, it ill becomes us to employ the same techniques as the Soviet Union.

- 8 The pointe o£ v!ew which I have been discussing are held b)• many
Americans.

It is their right to hold them and to expreu them.

It is alto

proper, however, to discuss the impact o£ these views on our foreign polic)'•
Sometimes the paramount national view becomes obscured by these conflichng
voices and the .Executive Branch finds it cli!!icult to hold to a consistent policy.
Nations abroad are also confused by the claahing viewpoints which o!ten
emanate from tho United States .

They may well wonder which one underlies

American policy at any given moment.

Each election here gives them pause

to consider whether or not a new composition o£ the government will result in an
abandonment of free world cooperation .
Even for those Americans who fully accept the necessity of allies and
eincerely desire to coope::-at:e, partnership is an advanced and difficult technique
of policy . It requires rr.ore

~kill,

and more understanding than a policy which

does not concern itself with pubHc opinion beyond its own borders. It requires
initiative and it requires an emphasis on constructive, long-range measures.
It r equires much more than slick slogans or easy handouts of aid.

Perhaps the clearest example of the difficulty o£ practicing good partne1
ship may be found in the economic realm.
reasons of self intere:Jt

'-S

well

::\S

In 1947-43 the United States, for

O\.!t o£ humanitarii'n mct:ves, established the

foreign aid programs to help the war -torn countries o£ Western Europe get back
on their feet.

These programs involved substantial gifts and transfers o£

American resources to !ore\t.,n cca:1tries. As American aid, coupled with the
hard work of tho Europeans themselves, began to restore the economy o£
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western Europe, the relationship of donor and recipient, inherent in the program.
created dissatisfaction among all concerned.

Among Americans there was a

growing resentment at the prolongation of the give-away of resources,

The

Europeans, on the other hand, also grew a little tired of playing the role of
poor relatives. One way aid was no longer adequate to the needs of the situation,
What was needed and is needed are new methods for assuring a durable solution
to the economic problems of the free nations.
The partnership concept suggests the desirability of terminating one-wa}
aid quickly and substituting mechanisms of cooperation on a basis of greater
equality of responsibility and effort among the free nations.

To find these

mechanisms is primarily the task of creative statesmanship. It is a much
slower and a much more difficult undertaking than the doling out of dollars, and
there has been a tendency to put it off.

Here again, however, leadership in the

free nations faces domestic counter pressures. It is handicapped in taking the
road of partnership by the fact that there are specific groups in the United States
and elsewhere which would be injured, at least in the short run, by alterations iq
present economic patterns among the nations of the world. Some, in effect,
would prefer that we give away our resources rather than get back something for
them in trade.

Domestic considerations of this kind cannot be ignored. On the

other hand, neither can we ignore the requirements for building free and peaceful
cooperation among self-reliant and self-respecting nations. I do not have an
easy answer to this dilemma, but the partnership concept calls for all to make
a sincere attempt to find the answers.

- tb ..
There are many other domestic pressure• which have varying degree• of
influence on the partnership appro ach.

For example, America is composed of

many different racial and religious groups.

These groups sometimes feel a

particular responsibility for the land of their origin, and political appeals are
often made to them on that basis.

You will recall, !or example, that before the

last Presidential election, we heard much irresponsible talk abo ut the liberation
of the Poles, the Czechs and other eastern European peoples.

And Sir Ro bert

I believe would be familiar with the vehement pressure which operates on
London by way of New York, Chicago, Boston and elsewhere in this country to enc
the unholy division of the Emerald Isle, particularly on St. Patrick's Day.
Moreover, if we consider the geographic span of the United States, it
is to be expected that regionalism plays some part in our thinking.
West may tend to be especially interested in the Far East.

We in the

Those on the East

Coast may be more concerned with our relations with Europe.

Often persons

from our southern States emphasize the problems of our relations with Latin
America.

All these influences affect our policy.

The surprising thing, however,

is that there is as much of a common outlook as does exist.
So far 1 have been speaking largely of the politic-s and pressures in our
own society which sometimes make it difficult for the United States to operate a
policy of partnership .

These same influences, or close counterparts, exist in

all democratic countries with which we are allied.
Certainly we are not the only nation in which domestic politics affect
foreign policy.

In any country there are political groups which, if in power,

-11conceivably would alter that country's policies respecting us.

Because we are

not sure what effect a change of political complexion will have, we become tremendously concerned, for example, with the outcome of elections in Great
Britain, France, Germany, or Italy.

Moreover, governments sometimes, in

order to stay in power, may make concessions to elements of their population
even though such concessions hamper their ability to cooperate with us and other
allies,
Neutralist thinking in Europe in some ways parallels the neo-isolationist
viewpoint in America.

The neutralists would like to believe that they can say

"a plague on both your houses" and have it mean security for themselves. If
they are not entangled with either the Soviet bloc or the United States, they say
they will be exempt from attack by either side,

Their difficulty, as with our own

nee-isolationists is that they cannot escape the fundamental reality of the 20th
Century, namely that no nation or even a small group of nations is an island
unto itself.

The threat is to freedom and if freedom declines in large segments

of the western world, as it will unless there is unity, it will be replaced by a
totalitarianism which sooner or later will engulf all who strive to remain
neutral.
Other nations, like ourselves, also find it difficult to attempt new
courses of action even when the methods of the past have lost much of their
usefulness. In Europe, for example, the advantages of integration are widely
recognized.

The larger market which would result, the abolition of trade

barriers, customs and varying currencies, would probably contribute much

- utoward increasing the prosperity of the entire reg1on.

The sub h m atlon o!

national groups into a regional Vestern Europeanis m might even help to bring
an end to the intra-European conflicts which have twice plunged the who le world
into devast&ting war .

Strengthening of Western Europe in th18 manner is

regarded by many in this country as the best defense against totalitarian
communism .

Howeve r, Europeans find it di!ficult to bring about unification

even as we find it easy to urge it.
What I have been trying to do to day is to point out a few of the questlone
involved in maintaining a united, a partnership approach a m ong the free nations.
Most of the difficulties of politics and pressures which stand in the way are
shared difficulties .

The problem confronting

u~;

and other free nations is to

make certain that these difficulties serve as a challenge to common action rather
than as a source of division or diversion from our common purpose.
Partnership requires forebearance, compassion , understanding and accommodation. It is not an easy approach to foreign policy.

If it succeeds,

however , it can produce a united str ength which will make each free nation
impervious both to the blustering threats and the glittering allures of
totalitarianism.

Most of all it will provide an international environment in

which individuals in this country and elsewhere will have an opportunity to
develop and to prosper in peace .

